05.21.09
The Supreme Court’s Definition of Sexual Harassment (Republished from December of 2008)
The statutory basis for the prohibition against sexual harassment is Title VII, which prohibits employers from hiring, firing, or otherwise discriminating in terms and conditions of employment on the basis of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Sexual harassment claims are divided into two categories: quid pro quo and hostile workplace environment. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when an employer or supervisor takes tangible employment action against an employee because of the employee’s unwillingness to provide sexual favors. The more controversial hostile workplace environment claims were initially recognized by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, SFB v. Vinson (1986). In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation, 29 CFR 1604.11(a) (1985), which defined sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” The court ruled that to be actionable, the harassment must be severe enough to alter the employee’s conditions of employment, creating what has become known as a “hostile environment.”
Subsequently, in Teresa Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1994), the Court clarified the previous ruling by explaining that the existence of a hostile environment can be determined “only by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance” (p. 369).
One issue that initially caused confusion was whether an employer could be held liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor when the employee suffered no tangible economic loss. In companion decisions in Ellerth v. Burlington and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the high court ruled that an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. However, when no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability by showing that (a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action.
One final controversial matter the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether one could sexually harass someone of the same sex. Initially, same‐sex harassment was not considered sexual harassment, but, in the case of Joseph Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Service (1998), the Supreme Court broadened the interpretation of the law and held that nothing in the act bars a cause simply because the plaintiff and defendant are members of the same sex. The critical issue, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, was “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed” (p. 78).
Referenced by Nancy K. Kubasek of Answers.com
